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Abstract
In this paper I investigate the topic of paranoid atmospheres. This subject is especially of interest
with respect to persons who are deluded, and also, I will demonstrate, sheds light upon the
psychiatrist's "gaze" and knowledge of delusions. In my argument I will follow a path initially outlined
by Karl Jaspers (1883-1969): modern psychiatric diagnosis of delusions is a diagnosis of form and
not content. Jaspers' emphasis on the form of delusions enables psychiatrists to be self-critical
about their professional knowledge and, consequently, prevent the development of dogmatic
attitudes. In accord with Jaspers, my argument will focus on the basic structure of delusions and
highlight the difference between delusional realities and non-delusional realities, a difference that
follows from the possibility of self-criticism of one's own conscious and explicit convictions. I will
demonstrate the importance of self-criticism with regard to paranoid atmospheres and also to
psychiatric knowledge. In this manner, an understanding of delusions as lived experience will be
developed, which argues that an escalation of the influence of delusional convictions, resulting in a
profoundly paranoid atmosphere, is most problematic for the deluded person. To acknowledge this
insight mirrors the need for a self-critique of psychiatric discourse, encourages an empathic and
respectful relationship between professionals and deluded patients, and enables deluded persons
to restrict their paranoid atmosphere. It is the main conclusion of my paper that a deluded person
cannot do (with respect to his delusional convictions) what a psychiatrist must do (with respect to
his psychiatric knowledge and his own existential convictions) in order to prevent a profoundly
paranoid atmosphere in their relationship: be self-critical.
Introduction
The reference point for psychiatry is the subjective experi-
ence of the person at hand. Prereflexive experience is
undeniable and cannot be rejected, though a person can
have doubts about the solidity or trueness of his experi-
ence. This prereflexive certainty of one's own experience is
also true in paranoia and raises the question: how can a
psychiatrist be so sure about the diagnosis of delusional
convictions? In this paper I will first demonstrate that this
question is still valid for us today. I will then discuss the
relationship of delusional convictions and psychiatric
knowledge in three dimensions: a) on the level of psychi-
atric knowledge including its historical background,
which appears like a legacy to modern psychiatry; b) with
regard to the psychiatrist as a person with self-critical abil-
ities, c) with regard to the deluded person as an existence.
Basically my argument will follow the same path in all
three dimensions as outlined by Karl Jaspers (1883-
1969): modern psychiatric diagnosis of delusions is a
diagnosis of form and not content, which enables the psy-
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chiatrist to be self-critical about his professional knowl-
edge and prevents a dogmatic conception of his
knowledge. Following Jaspers my argument will focus on
the basic structure of delusions and highlights the differ-
ence between delusional realities and non-delusional
realities, the later are seen in the possibility for self-criti-
cism of one's own conscious and explicit convictions. I
will demonstrate the importance of this possibility for
self-criticism in all three dimensions and will spell out its
connections with what, in this paper, shall be called 'par-
anoid atmosphere'. Thereby I also develope an under-
standing of delusions as lived experience which integrates
the first-person-perspective of the deluded person. It is the
main conclusion of my paper that a deluded person can-
not do (with regards to his delusional convictions) what a
psychiatrist must do (with regards to his psychiatric
knowledge and his existential convictions) in order to pre-
vent a profoundly paranoid atmosphere in their relation-
ship: be self-critical.
I. Subjective experience, psychiatric knowledge and 
delusional convictions
In the following paragraph I will demonstrate that the
question 'How can a psychiatrist be so sure about the
diagnosis of delusional convictions?' is still of actual
importance since it is in a structural way connected with
the relationship between patient and psychiatrist, namely
with the interrelation of the first-person-perspective of the
patient and the psychiatric knowledge of the psychiatrist.
As I already said, the subjective experience of the person at
hand is the starting point for psychiatry. Listening care-
fully and with empathy helps build a good relationship
with the patient, which will activate resources for coping
with symptoms. Furthermore, it offers the possibility to
clarify the wishes, goals and values of the disturbed per-
son, which gives the whole treatment perspective and
direction. Yet, when trying to help someone who suffers
from mental disorder, more is required than listening
carefully and with empathy (though this is important).
For a psychiatrist it is also necessary to look behind the
report and narrative a person is giving in a situation of
clinical exploration. This necessity becomes clear when
considering the aims of psychiatric treatment from the
patient's perspective. These aims are a) the relief of the
patient's suffering, b) the patient's contentment with his
way of living - which includes especially the interpersonal
dimension - and c) the patient being in charge of his life
again. The two last aims are contentious in the medical
model, but not for a person-centered psychiatry when tak-
ing the first-person-perspective of the concerned person
into account [1]. It is this patient's perspective that I will
focus on in my paper.
In order to approach these aims it is not enough simply to
feel with the patient empathically. If for example an elder
patient is not drinking enough water in hot summer, it is
possible that he becomes delirious and developes persecu-
tory delusions. In this situation, it requires more than just
feeling with him, but realizing that he is dehydrated and
possibly also hyponatraemic. It is necessary to do some-
thing that has good evidence on its side to alter the subjec-
tive experience positively and to help the person to
recover without harming him. In the given example this
means starting a careful rehydratation therapy and con-
trolling the sodium concentration in blood serum. For the
psychiatrist it is therefore essential to understand the
inner psychic structure and conditions predisposing, trig-
gering and maintaining mental disturbances. In other
words: psychiatrists are interested in the etiology of men-
tal disturbances of the person at hand from a third-per-
son-perspective as well as from a first-person perspective
(subjective experience, inner reality, wishes and values).
Psychopathological symptoms are of interest both as a
subjective experience the person has to cope with and as a
sign for a supposedly underlying pathological process.
A psychiatrist can't read minds, but armed with profes-
sional knowledge and training, he is increasingly able to
detect signals people are unconsciously and non-verbally
communicating and to become aware of aspects of a per-
son that the person is trying to hide from himself. With
regard to this twofold assessment of psychiatric explora-
tion it is not surprising that a psychiatrist is somehow able
to look deeply into another person's mind, maybe in cer-
tain aspects even "deeper" than the person himself. In the
given example the psychiatrist's interpretation that the
patient is suffering from dehydration is quite different
from the patient's view, who is maybe convinced that the
KGB is behind it all. Even though the psychiatrist gains no
complete insight into another person's mind, it is no won-
der that people get suspicious about the psychiatrist. Will
an atmosphere of suspicion not provoke a more or less
suspicious client? Will the suspicious client not hide
things thereby provoking suspicion on the part of the psy-
chiatrist?
With respect to the necessity of looking behind the subjec-
tive experience of the patient and interpreting his symp-
toms as signs of an underlying psychopathological
process, we can state the thesis, that there is a latent para-
noid atmosphere in the relationship of psychiatrist and
patient. For psychiatry this is an important problem. What
if the old man is in fact persecuted by an intelligence serv-
ice and someone added a diuretic substance in his drink
in order to provoke dehydration? Of course this sounds a
little odd, but it shows the importance of the question:
how can a psychiatrist be so sure about the distinctionPhilosophy, Ethics, and Humanities in Medicine 2009, 4:14 http://www.peh-med.com/content/4/1/14
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between delusional and non-delusional realities in his
day-to-day business?
This problem accompanies psychiatry from the start, as I
will show in this paper in the next step. In particular the
anti-psychiatric movement criticised the positivistic atti-
tude of psychiatric knowledge in the 60's and 70's of the
last century. As Kotowicz argued, two main lines of argu-
ment were formulated: on the one hand, "madness" and
other mental disturbances were viewed as a reflection of
the "system" (e.g. the family, psychiatric institutions and
treatments, society on the whole) and on the other hand
it was observed, that our society and especially psychiatry
did not perceive the creative and primary force of "mad-
ness" and its ancient truths ([2], p. 113). Surely delusions
are only a special case of what can be called "madness",
and there is strong evidence that the "trouble generator"
of "madness" or schizophrenia is not primarily connected
with delusions, but with self-disturbances [3,4]. Yet, at the
basis of the anti-psychiatric arguments lies a deep scepti-
cism regarding psychiatric knowledge. It is this scepticism
that is connected with the question; How can psychiatrists
be so sure about their distinctions between delusional and
non-delusional realities?
This problem was not only addressed by the anti-psychi-
atric movement in a sceptical way, but already by Karl Jas-
pers in a more phenomenological one. His solution to the
problem, the most favoured in the modern psychiatric
discourse, is the insight that a) delusional realities are
structured differently than non-delusional realities and b)
the main reason for suffering is not the delusional convic-
tions themselves but rather the escalation of these convic-
tions and their taking over the entire reality of the person
such that degrees of freedom are decreased. In the follow-
ing I will argue that this insight, as can be found e.g. in the
"Allgemeine Psychopathologie" (General Psychopathol-
ogy) from Karl Jaspers [5] or in modern times in the writ-
ings of Michael Musalek [6], highlights and shows the
need for self-criticism in psychiatric discourse. As already
mentioned, it is my thesis that psychiatrists must be able
to reconsider their professional decisions and knowledge
with regards to the fact, that human beings are not able to
discuss the question "Who am I?" exhaustively.
II. The "psychiatric gaze" and the Enlightenment
In this section I will discuss the early history of psychiatry
as an example and legacy of what can happen if psychia-
trists do not remind themselves from time to time about
the dangers that ensue when psychiatric knowledge
becomes dogmatic to the degree that they are deemed by
someone to be not falsifiable. It is my thesis that this dan-
ger is present if we lose the competence for radical self-cri-
tique, because a paranoid atmosphere always lurks in the
background of psychiatry as already argued above on
behalf of the difference between subjective experience and
psychiatric knowledge.
Psychiatry developed around 1800 in different European
countries and in the United States of America correspond-
ing to a paradigmatic shift in medicine. As Nelly Tsouy-
opoulos in particular pointed out, the Brunonian system
of medicine, a special vitalism developed by John Brown
(1735-1788) and focusing on the excitability of the
human body's tissue, turned the entire concept of disease
upside down [7]. Until that time diseases were under-
stood as natural entities ([8], p. 31-35). The basic theme
of this former concept is the assumption that every disease
has a somewhat typical feature more or less distorted by
the individual body it resides in and that it has its own
natural course. As a consequence, diseases are deemed to
have their own and somewhat different processes than
those going on in healthy persons. In this concept delu-
sions were often understood as an obsession with an
unfriendly spirit or a toxic miasma. The central aim of
treatment is then to help the disease run its natural course,
so that the disease can come to its preordained end and
the body can be free of the disease again. In order to treat
the disease correctly it is indeed necessary to make the cor-
rect diagnosis, which is complicated because the original
disease is distorted by the individual body it has taken up
with for residence.
In the new physiological paradigm things are understood
totally differently: Diseases are now thought to use nor-
mal physiological processes in the human body - partially
altering these due to the logics of the processes - and pro-
ducing themselves using these processes. Symptoms of
disease must then be understood as signs of the underly-
ing process of the disease - the dehydration for example -
and the job of the medical doctor consists of reading and
deciphering the disease written in signs in body or mind
of the individual. Another important change concerns the
status of subjective well-being, that is distinguished from
normal (psycho-)somatic functioning in Brunonianism.
Subjective well-being is not simply a different quality of
normal bodily functions and pathological functions does
not necessarily lead to feeling ill [7]. In modern medicine
this is one of the most important differentiations as can be
seen especially in chronic diseases. As a consequence of
this radical change in understanding the functioning of
the human body the concept of diseases as natural entities
taking up residence in the human body or mind lost sci-
entific support. This is also true for psychiatric discourse,
even though later e.g. Emil Kraepelin (1856-1926), one of
the most important founders of psychiatry and especially
creator of the distinction of schizophrenia and affective
psychoses, assumed schizophrenia ('Dementia praecox')
to be a natural entity [9]. These dramatic changes in med-
icine at the end of the 18th century mirrored the processPhilosophy, Ethics, and Humanities in Medicine 2009, 4:14 http://www.peh-med.com/content/4/1/14
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of enlightenment in European culture at that time though
the Brunonian system of medicine as well as closely
related vitalism needed further enlightment in the future.
With regards to the foundation of psychiatry, it is impor-
tant to note that the enlightening of the inner world of
human beings was a widespread cultural interest of
enlightened individuals partially motivated by their hope
to understand themselves better and was a broad social
theme with political power in the awakening societies
([10], p. 397; [11], p. 128).
Many psychiatrists at that time agreed on the basic
assumption that they could really see the animallike part
of the human psyche in madness. They understood the
"psychiatric gaze" in a way similar to the German doctor
Johann Christian Reil (1759-1813), though often with
slightly different attitudes or a different philosophical
background ([12], p. 273). Johann Christian Reil (1759-
1813), official medical doctor of the town in Halle and
chair of medicine at the University of Halle from 1787,
and from 1810 chair of medicine at the just founded Uni-
versity in Berlin, was the leading person regarding the
invention and foundation of psychiatry in Germany,
often compared with Philippe Pinel (1745-1826) ([13], p.
21). Reil did not only invent the word psychiatry ("Psychi-
aterie") in 1808, he also wrote an important textbook
about psychic disturbances.
In his "Rhapsodies about the exertion of the psychic cure
on disrupted mental conditions" (1803; Rhapsodieen
über die Anwendung der psychischen Curmethode auf
Geisteszerrüttungen), Reil reflected on psychic distur-
bances, especially madness, utilizing a mixture of vitalism
and natural philosophy as influenced by Schelling [14].
With regard to madness, Reil's distinction of a "Seelenor-
gan" ("organ of the mind"), localized in the brain, and a
"Gemeingefühl" (sensus communis), localized in all
other parts of the nervous system, are of special interest.
Whereas the "Seelenorgan" was the central point of the
psyche, in which a rational synthesis of all other mental
elements was possible and which could affect all other
parts of the psyche, the "Gemeingefühl" was a compila-
tion of the senses, affects, drives and imagination and
more animal-like ([14], p. 32). The main cause of a men-
tal disease was the imbalance of those two "organs": a
missing rational synthesis of the "Seelenorgan" on the
one hand and/or an intensified production of imagina-
tions, incentives or affects and moods on the other hand,
overburdening the abilities of the "Seelenorgan" of this
person and therefore overflowing their consciousness,
rendering it unevaluated and uncontrolled. As a conse-
quence, the medical doctor assumed that he could directly
see the inner reality - the products of the "Gemeingefühl"
- of the mentally ill, because the synthetic function of the
rational "Seelenorgan" no longer hid the inner reality
from others via transformation. Furthermore it is assumed
in this understanding that the "madman" is not able to
criticise or evaluate his own experiences due to his
impaired or overwhelmed "Seelenorgan", so that he can-
not detect that his experiences are only imaginations pro-
duced by his "Gemeingefühl". A deep analogy can be
found between the doctor's "clinical gaze" on the "mad-
man" and the gaze of the "Seelenorgan" on its inner real-
ity, because both gazes are assumed to see this inner
reality straight and unaltered as it is produced by the
"Gemeingefühl" ([12], p. 280).
In this assumption a paranoid atmosphere is hidden. If
this assumption is true, the psychiatrist could decide
whether a subjective experience, intention or behaviour is
a sign of "madness" - since it would only be a product of
the animal-like part of the psyche - or if it is a true subjec-
tive experience that can claim to be the experience of a
healthy person. The consequences are immense. If our old
man is in fact persecuted by the KGB and there is a hostile
special agent trying to kill him with a diuretic substance
causing dehydration and delirium, the psychiatrist's diag-
nosis of persecutory delusions would, with false confi-
dence, clarify that the persecution by the KGB was unreal
from the beginning and that the old man does not need to
fear anything from them. That is of course great nonsense
and the anti-psychiatric critique would then be right to say
that psychiatric knowledge is positivistic and anti-psychi-
atric critique would then be right to say that psychiatric
knowledge may itself be no more than dogmatic knowl-
edge and even a form of delusion. And it would be dan-
gerous, especially for our old man.
In this situation it is fruitful for psychiatrists to remind
themselves from time to time about the danger that can
occur when psychiatric knowledge becomes a non-falsifi-
able conviction. It is my thesis that this danger is in place
if psychiatry loses the competence for radical self-critique,
which can "bracket" the taken-for-granted distinction of a
delusional and a non-delusional reality. Such a fruitful
self-critique can be compared with a phenomenological
approach, which can basically also be described as a
"bracketing" of the natural experience meaning an artifi-
cial alienation of the "taken for granted" experience. This
"bracketing" involves radically changing the point of
view, so that one can discover through progressive phe-
nomenological work how one's experience is inherently
structured and given. The question is therefore how delu-
sional experience is inherently structured, which leads to
the formal definition of delusions as presented by Karl Jas-
pers.
III. The psychiatric knowledge of delusion
In this section I will address the formal definition of delu-
sional realities as presented by Karl Jaspers in a morePhilosophy, Ethics, and Humanities in Medicine 2009, 4:14 http://www.peh-med.com/content/4/1/14
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detailed way and I will discuss the actual psychiatric
knowledge of delusions with regard to this definition. Fur-
ther I will demonstrate that this leads to an understanding
of delusional realities that introduces the amending con-
cept of a paranoid atmosphere, which is also of clinical
importance as presented by Michael Musalek.
Though it sometimes seems as if there is no commonly
accepted definition of delusion in modern psychiatry,
most psychiatric textbooks favour an understanding of
delusion according to Karl Jaspers. Jaspers rejected the
idea that people with delusions have false beliefs about
their situation, and argued that delusions represent a par-
ticular kind of knowledge ([5], p. 48). A person with per-
secutory delusions does not believe that he is persecuted;
he knows that he is persecuted. Our old man is absolutely
certain that the KGB is behind it all, and even the best
argument will not convince him that this is not the case.
For Jaspers, this differentiation of knowledge and belief
was essential to understanding delusions.
Jaspers was not primarily interested in the theme or con-
tent of delusions, though he was of course interested in
them secondarily because they were of outstanding
importance for the deluded person. Rather he was inter-
ested in the structural change of knowledge that can be
found in delusions. The knowledge of the deluded per-
son, e.g. his certainty that he is being persecuted, shows an
extraordinary high degree of conviction ('unvergleichlich
hohe subjektive Gewissheit') ([5], p. 45) and is further-
more immune to any counter-arguments or alternative
explanations. The conviction is therefore also incorrigible.
This incorrigibility ('Unkorrigierbarkeit') is the central cri-
terion for delusion in the Jasperian view ([5], p. 46). In
accordance with the Jasperian understanding Berner
pointed out that the two criteria 'extraordinary degree of
conviction' and 'rejection of alternative explanations'
('incorrigibility') are obligatory for the diagnosis of delu-
sion, but that the often impossible seeming content of the
delusions is only an accessory criterion [15]. Though it is
sensible to argue, that this incorrigible certainty of a con-
viction and the corresponding pre-reflexive interpretation
of reality are only an extreme with regard to an uncer-
tainty-certainty continuum, this does not question the
basic Jasperian assumption regarding the structural
change of knowledge in delusions ([6], p. 157).
Furthermore, most important for the persistence and
maintenance of the delusions, the deluded person creates
a paranoid atmosphere around him. With respect to
maintaining the delusions and creating a paranoid atmos-
phere Musalek points out two factors ([6], p. 161). One
factor is the self-dynamics of delusions happening on an
interpersonal and prereflexive level. Basically this idea is
very simple and maybe therefore frequently overlooked,
since it means that delusional symptomatology itself cre-
ates via the non- and para-verbal interaction with others a
paranoid atmosphere maintaining all delusional convic-
tions: "People who are usually very open and friendly
with others may react to the deluded patient with some
reservation and resentment because of the patient's suspi-
cious behaviour. This serves to reinforce the suspicion of
the patient. In this manner a vicious circle may be estab-
lished, amplifying and prolonging paranoid behaviours
and ideas." ([6], p. 166)
The second factor is the meaning of delusions themselves,
since they offer a 'safe' interpretation in an unsecure
world, even though these ideas may need permanent
defense in relationships with others regarding the label
"lunatic". This intensifies the paranoid atmosphere,
meaning that the "whole world" falls under the influence
of the delusional convictions ('polarized delusions'). As a
consequence this person cannot function normally in
day-to-day life, because the delusional convictions are
moving and motivating the person more and more and
create a hermetic and static ('frozen', Musalek) paranoid
atmosphere. Yet it is equally important to know that a per-
son suffering from delusions in the Jasperian sense can
still function normally if the delusions constitute merely
a more or less parallel world he lives in ('delusions in jux-
taposition'). This illustrates the well-known fact that per-
sons with delusions seldom suffer from the delusions
themselves but from the loss of freedom when the delu-
sional interpretation starts to take over the first-person-
perspective of the deluded person and creates a paranoid
atmosphere [16]. This is especially true when non-delu-
sional reality encroaches on a deluded person in a manner
that contradicts his delusional convinctions. For example
if our deluded person is certain that he does not need to
pay taxes, the tax office will challenge this conviction in
their claim that taxes must be paid. This not only creates a
loss of degrees of freedom on the financial and/or forensic
level, but can also provoke the creation and/or intensifica-
tion of a paranoid atmosphere. While Jaspers three diag-
nostic criteria for delusions are non-interpersonal, the
more important aspects with regard to the suffering and
agony of the deluded person - the polarizing of the world
and the maintenance of delusional convictions that influ-
ence the "whole world" (via the 'paranoid atmosphere') -
are interpersonal [17].
Yet this paranoid atmosphere also offers narcissistic grati-
fication for the deluded person. From an interpersonal
standpoint the deluded person knows himself to be the
most important person around, since the interest and
behaviour of almost everybody is focusing on him: e.g. in
persecutory delusions the persecuted person is of out-
standing importance, since it is he being persecuted by the
"whole world". This is even more pronounced in delu-Philosophy, Ethics, and Humanities in Medicine 2009, 4:14 http://www.peh-med.com/content/4/1/14
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sions of grandeur or in religious delusions. In this sense it
can be said: every deluded person is a pop-star, but he is
the only one who knows ([17], p. 142). Yet this paranoid
atmosphere can also show a clearly negative attitude, e.g.
when the person has the incorrigible conviction of blam-
ing himself for everything going wrong in the world
around him. Even in persecutory delusions this negative
quality is present in the angst and dread of being perse-
cuted anytime in any situation and from nearly anybody,
because these things go together. Apparently it is a mixed
blessing being the centre of the world, demonstrating
beside the interpersonal quality also the power of para-
noid atmospheres.
IV. Paranoid atmospheres and alternative explanations - 
Lydia
In this section I will address a question which logically
comes up with respect to the psychiatric knowledge
described above: Does psychiatric knowledge of delusions
truly solve the problem that arises with the potentially
paranoid atmosphere of the psychiatrist's "gaze"? Draw-
ing also on a clinical case I will demonstrate that psychi-
atric understanding of delusions in fact solves this
problem, if and only if such understanding is open to
alternative explanations - in one word: is corrigible or fal-
sifiable - due to the inner logic of its basic assumptions.
Only then it is not simply mirroring the paranoid atmos-
phere in the "psychiatric gaze" and replacing belief with a
non-falsifiable and dogmatic (maybe sometimes even
'delusional') knowledge on its own. This answer appar-
ently has at least two aspects: first it has to be clear what
shall be open for alternative explanations and second cor-
rigibility must be available to the psychiatrist in his day-
to-day work. In the text that follows I will argue that the
psychiatrist's knowledge of delusions is falsifiable on the
concrete and patient-centered level, since it is a formal
definition in the sense that every possible deluded person
holds incorrigible convictions not open to alternative
explanations. This means also that the Jasperian defini-
tion of delusions is itself falsifiable on the formal level, for
example if anybody can think of a person who is deluded
and does not hold incorrigible convictions which are not
open to alternative explanations.
The first aspect of my answer addresses the problem that
not delusions themselves but deluded persons are coming
to seek our help. Jasperian diagnostic criteria for delusions
do not address the question "How does the person feel?".
In contrast with the assumption that deluded persons
have false beliefs about their situations, Jasperian diag-
nostic criteria for delusions simply acknowledge the spe-
cial structure of delusional realities. This means, that a
person with persecutory delusions, let's call her Lydia,
could in fact be being persecuted. Furthermore, the diag-
nosis "delusion" is not equivalent with profound knowl-
edge of the deluded person, but offers only an in-depth
comprehension of one aspect of this person.
Last but not least, Jasperian diagnostic criteria for delu-
sions offer no certain knowledge about underlying proc-
esses of disease, even though some delusions show special
characteristics due to the underlying process ([5], p. 45).
Delusions in affective disorders, for example, typically
correspond to the mood of the person. The delusional
theme is often psychologically connected with the life-his-
tory of the deluded person [15]. Lydia, for example, devel-
oped delusional convictions in a two months interval
when substituted for a colleague in an employment site
where workers were routinely monitored and videotaped.
Lydia had just started working again after pausing due to
her two children and was employed as a secretary in the
state Office of Criminal Investigation. She had problems
coping with the tasks of her work, especially typing, and
she made a lot of typing errors in her first weeks. Feeling
ashamed about her bad performance, she secretly took the
error-laden papers home and destroyed the sheets pains-
takingly by ripping them into small pieces. She developed
the conviction that members of her office were persecut-
ing her due to her taking the papers home and were even
monitoring her private apartment. A few months later she
was convinced that even the Secret Service was behind it.
The delusional conviction didn't interfere with her work
performance and she continued working without note-
worthy problems for the next five years.
With regard to therapeutic aims it was important to deve-
lope an empathic and respectful rapport with Lydia, even
if this is "only" the basis for concrete psychopharmacolog-
ical treatment. In the case of Lydia this meant avoiding
arguing about the truth or falsity of the delusions. Instead
I as her psychiatrist argued that her degrees of freedom
were minimized due to the escalation of the influence of
those convictions. Nine years later Lydia is still convinced
that she was monitored and persecuted in the first few
months when acting for a colleague, but she is sure that
some time after those months the real persecution ended
and she became ill with persecutory delusions. Yet this
conviction does not impair her day-to-day abilities and
she lives her life in an unspectacular and completely nor-
mal way. In other words: it is not necessary to wipe out the
delusional convictions once and for all in order to be ther-
apeutically successful. Therapy is successful if the para-
noid atmosphere of the delusions can be diminished, if
the delusional conviction is brought in 'juxtaposition' or
has become a simple private and personal delusional con-
viction again, which is meant here more in the sense of a
hobby than an obsession.
Lydia is now, three years after the acute episode of mental
illness, well aware that her conviction of being persecutedPhilosophy, Ethics, and Humanities in Medicine 2009, 4:14 http://www.peh-med.com/content/4/1/14
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by the Secret Service after the first months was a delu-
sional conviction and that the main reason for suffering
and not governing her own life was the escalation of this
conviction. This escalation led to a paranoid atmosphere
through a long lasting and slow process of expansion, in
which at the end for example a placard provoked the
spontaneous idea ('Wahneinfall') that someone had just
searched her apartment forcing her to take a cab to rush
back and make the best of it. At this time she was almost
constantly afraid that someone would search her apart-
ment, so that she replaced the locks on the front door and
all windows nearly weekly. All these activities created con-
stant distress, anxiety and interference with day-to-day
activities.
In that state of mind, Lydia needed to open herself to
alternative explanations concerning her suffering, the loss
of contentment with her way of living and her passivity
and helplessness. As a deluded person she knew for cer-
tain that her persecutors were the reason for her great dis-
tress. As her psychiatrist I was convinced otherwise; that
the underlying process of disease and especially the para-
noid atmosphere were the main reasons for her suffering,
but I was not incorrigible with this knowledge - after all
persecuted persons can in fact be persecuted. I respected
her delusional convictions as a possible interpretation of
the situation at hand, though they had only extremely
small evidence on their side. My main goal was not to cor-
rect Lydia's convictions, but to set limits to the paranoid
atmosphere. A first step was building a relationship with
her, in which we were able to develop alternative explana-
tions e.g. for her tenseness in many situations which was
associated with a formal disturbance of her thinking.
Those alternative explanations gave her reasons to take a
small dose of an antipsychotic medication which, of
course, helped her to open her mind to even more alter-
native explanations of her actual situation. Yet this didn't
alter her conviction of being persecuted in the beginning.
Making room for alternative explanations implied setting
limits to the paranoid atmopshere and vice versa. In the
end the regained openness for alternative explanations
helped Lydia get along with her life more contently and be
in charge of her life again.
V. Knowledge or Belief? The psychiatrist's need for self-
critique
After having demonstrated the importance of self-critique
with regard to psychiatric understanding of delusional
realities in a person-centered and structural sense, I will in
this section address the question: What enabled me to be
content with "a smaller success" in treatment? I will argue
that it is one's personal ability for self-criticism and that
this personal ability is connected with what Jaspers called
"existential convictions" or the ability to "believe" in a
philosophical sense.
What enables the psychiatrist to respect the delusional
convictions of the deluded person as a possible, though
notwithstanding all the entailed 'safety' and narcissistic
gratification, most unfavourable interpretation of the
world? It is my thesis that this is possible with the aid of
Jasperian criteria for delusions which free the psychiatrist
from any need to discuss delusional convictions on the
level of truth or falsity or the level of believe it or not. This
becomes clearer by remembering the Jasperian distinction
between knowledge and belief and his thesis that in delu-
sions knowledge replaces belief; an important distinction
for the psychiatrist in his day-to-day work. In the follow-
ing I will spell out in a more detailed way the difference
between knowledge as a falsifiable cognition and belief as
a non-falsifiable cognition. Such a distinction helps psy-
chiatrists avoid two problematic modes of interaction
with deluded patients. On the one hand, being forced to
lie to deluded patients for example in an affirmative way
("Yes, the Secret Service is behind it all.") or, on the other,
being forced to become relativistic and deny for example
that antipsychotic medications will help limit the para-
noid atmosphere. Both consequences can be fatal in eve-
ryday work.
When trying to understand this more profoundly it is nec-
essary to remember the main distinction between knowl-
edge and belief. In the formation of knowledge as explicit
knowledge lived experience is necessarily divided into a
known object and a knowing subject. This splitting is pre-
formed in intentionality, since consciousness is always
consciousness of something and never consciousness on its
own and without content. Yet, such splitting of inten-
tional relatedness can never be absolute or perfect, as is
the main thesis of Husserl's concept of intentionality, and
can therefore only happen on a superficial level without
really touching the underlying basis of intentionality even
if the later is not consciously assured. In science this split-
ting takes place in the process of objectification with a sci-
entific method, producing a falsifiable and method-
dependent knowledge that has good evidence on its side
and can be interpersonally agreed on. It is therefore an
explicit and concrete knowledge. Often the constructive
process of objectification as well as the underlying and
necessary basis of intentionality are "forgotten", so that
the known object or structure seems to have a life of its
own in the world. This "forgetting" is not meant as a gen-
eral critique but rather as a statement regarding the status
of scientific knowledge. Remembering the underlying
basis of intentionality and the constructive process of
objectivation is the main source of scientific self-critique.
Acknowledging this primary basis spells out why we are
not all-mighty and completely autonomous constructors
of our world and that there is a passive givenness on a
phenomenal level [18]. This mirrors the well known fact
that lived experience is always prior to our reflective con-Philosophy, Ethics, and Humanities in Medicine 2009, 4:14 http://www.peh-med.com/content/4/1/14
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sciousness, which means that we are already always given
in a "pre-reflective self-awareness, including its immedi-
ate, implicit, nonobjectifying, and passive nature" ([19],
p. 71).
The acknowledgement of this passivity of being given can-
not be transferred into knowledge in an explicit and con-
cretely measurable way, yet it can be integrated in life in
the sense of a belief ([20], p. 99 and p. 282). In contrast to
knowledge it is typical for the epistemological status of a
believed content that it is not explicitly clear in every
aspect. The believed content draws on special personal
experiences, to which it refers at the same moment. These
personal experiences are typical experiences of something
incomparable, something indefinable in the end and can,
for example, be possible in special situations via special
techniques or practices. It can be argued that the episte-
mological status of a belief has nothing to do with tran-
scendence or with this incomparable and indefinable self-
affection. This is true. Yet it is important to notice that the
epistemological status of a special content, which is
believed and not known (due to impaired knowledge), is
typically fashioned in a way that a last remaining uncer-
tainty is spelled out as an explicit part of this special belief.
In a delusional conviction exactly this last indefinability is
lost. It is not believed to be the KGB, the deluded person
knows that it is the KGB. It is this replacement of belief
with knowledge that qualifies a delusional interpretation
of the world as a safe island in the storms of uncertainty.
In his first edition of his "General Psychopathology" Jas-
pers comes to a similar conclusion. The psychopatholo-
gist should beware the borders of his possible scientific
understanding: "This border is found if he is confronted
with a single person, for he cannot dissolve this person
completely in his psychological concepts. The more he
brings his concepts to bear, characterizing and knowing as
typical or regular, the more he gets to know that some-
thing incognizable is still hiding therein, something he
can feel and suspect, but that he cannot grasp once and for
all. For him as a psychopathologist it is enough to know
about this infiniteness of every individual that cannot be
exhausted; as a human being he may see more besides
this; or, if others are seeing this incomparable more, he
should at least not be meddling in it with his psychopa-
thology." ([5], p. 1, translation mine) Jaspers names three
typical ways for a psychopathologist to overstep the bor-
ders of his scientific conceptions: a) the 'somatic precon-
ception' (das somatische Vorurteil) especially in the sense
of a 'brain mythology' (Hirnmythologie), b) the 'philo-
sophical preconception' (das philosophische Vorurteil)
especially in the sense of a non-experienced speculative
conceptualization and c1) the 'escalation of correct
assumptions' (Übertreibung richtiger Anschauungen) for
example leading to the conviction that people believing in
a divine genesis are completely uneducated or c2) the 'ren-
dering absolute of special standpoints' (Verabsolutierung
einzelner Gesichtspunkte) in the sense of being a stickler
for principles or in the sense of overgeneralizing, meaning
for example being convinced that elephants have tusks
and that therefore female Indian elephants can be not real
elephants ([5], p. 9). These ways are all equal with regard
to replacing belief with knowledge. In this replacing they
become incorrigible, non-falsifiable and dogmatic and, in
a certain sense, even comparable with delusional convic-
tions.
Even more pointed is Jaspers critique regarding this prob-
lem in his later works after developing his existential phi-
losophy. The most important idea regarding his
existential philosophy is his rejection of a possible abso-
lute conviction on the level of conscious and method-
dependent knowledge and his absolute conviction that
absolute convictions can only have the character of exis-
tential beliefs ([21], II p. 232 and III p. 137; [22], p. 44;
[23], p. 16). Contents of belief "remain in the abeyance of
being not-known [...] They are addressed and used too
quickly as a knowledge and thereby lose their sense."
([23], p. 33, translation mine) Life is a good example for
this. No one really knows what life is though we are all
absolutely certain of being alive. If someone claims to
know exactly and to the point what life itself is, it can be
suspected that this person doesn't understand much, since
life is always more than any conception of it.
The believed content is only meaningful for and is bound
to the believing person, overcomes the subject-object-
splitting and can be complete nonsense for another per-
son. Therefore believed contents are existential convic-
tions ([23], p. 16). Jaspers understood the content of
existential convictions as "Chiffre", which is the imma-
nent reality of transcendence. The "Chiffre" as a symbol
has a double meaning: it symbolizes something infinitely
more than the symbol itself and is on the other hand still
just an immanent symbol ([21], III p. 141). A "Chiffre" is
not necessarily a sign, it can be a natural formation like
Ayer's Rock or a book like the bible. Life for example is
symbolized in many ways and the most famous sign for
life is the old Egyptian hieroglyph "ankh", the coptic
cross. The coptic cross is not life itself, but as a symbol for
the true phenomenon of life it refers to. Following Jaspers
this duality shall not be understood as such: "The Chiffre
is the being, bringing transcendence into presence, with-
out the need for transcendence becoming a being as an
object or for existence becoming a being as a subject."
([23], III p. 137, translation mine) The question remains:
does this not lead to the imagination of a transcendence
"behind" the "Chiffre", for which the "Chiffre" is just the
clue and the symbol? If this would really be true, then an
important question comes up, since then existence in thePhilosophy, Ethics, and Humanities in Medicine 2009, 4:14 http://www.peh-med.com/content/4/1/14
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Jasperian sense would mean something "behind",
"beneath" or "beside" the concrete person. Then we
would have to face the problem of extreme relativity in the
sense already mentioned above. As I will argue in the fol-
lowing part, Jaspers was well aware of this danger of
extreme subjectivism. Even though existence in the Jaspe-
rian sense is principally an option for every human being,
it is necessary to acknowledge that one's concrete beliefs
are at least partially one's own product. With psychiatric
knowledge in the background it is easy to see that exactly
this is problematic for a deluded person. Yet I will argue
in the last section that a deluded person can be under-
stood as existence in the Jasperian sense if the person's
perspective is not dominated by the delusional convic-
tions respectively if the paranoid atmosphere does not
encompass the "whole world".
VI. Future prospects: being deluded and existence
In this section I will discuss whether a deluded person can
be understood as an existence in the sense of Jaspers. I will
demonstrate that especially the escalation of delusional
convictions - in the sense of creating a profound paranoid
atmosphere - prevents existing in the Jasperian sense and
that this corresponds to clinical experience, as demon-
strated in a second clinical case, that delusional 'polariza-
tion' of the "whole world" is the main reason for suffering.
Existence in the Jasperian sense is principally an option
for every human being. It is generated in border situa-
tions: "The truth of eudaimonia evolves from the bottom
of failure." ([21], II p. 232, translation mine). The per-
formance of border situations means that the person real-
izes that the limits of his being cannot be changed but can
be adopted as fundamental structure of his own existence.
One of the border situations Jaspers names, besides death,
affliction/suffering, guilt and historicity, is struggling
(fighting, German: 'Kampf'). "Inevitably I have to co-cre-
ate struggling and being involved in it as a border situa-
tion, I can get aware of myself existentially and adopt this
border situation." ([21], II p. 233, translation mine) In the
long run a fight is a matter of life and death, though the
inescapable need to struggle does not mean chaos or vio-
lence. Instead it asks every person to acknowledge and
adopt it as a situation inescapably mine. Even in love
struggle is a inherent aspect of existence: "Love is no cal-
culable possession. I have to struggle with myself and the
existence of the loved one, without violence, but chal-
lenged and challenging. [...] Love as a concrete event in
time is always incomplete and imperfect." ([21], II p. 244,
translation mine).
Obviously existing in the Jasperian sense implies accept-
ing and adopting this contradictory structure of being
(antinomische Struktur des Daseins') ([21], II p. 250). Jas-
pers points out that existence affords a clear distinction
from simple being, since existence implies being aware of
one's own limits ([21], II p. 284). This can become clear
at the "wailing wall of the existence" [24], though the
mere insight into this border situation as an inescapable
part of one's own existence does not necessarily mean that
a person has the power and the ability to overcome his
wailing wall and to adopt the limits of this situation on a
new level of his existence. Jaspers was well aware of this
difficulty: "I am existence only in unity with the knowl-
edge of transcendence as the force, through which I myself
am [...] Without existence the sense of transcendence
would perish" ([22], p. 44, translation mine) Furthermore
both existence and transcendence cannot be defined with
concrete criteria, because then "the original thought of
encompassment would be lost" ([22], p. 54, translation
mine).
But is it enough to be aware of one's deepest indefinability
in order to overcome one's wailing wall and to endure in
life as existence? Robert, a seventy year old man and a
maverick all his life, was very well aware that he as a per-
son and life as a phenomenon could not be explained
completely. Yet he was truly suffering from not being able
to sleep at home anymore due to his conviction that he
was being persecuted by an unknown organisation and in
danger when sleeping in his bed. For over twenty years he
often slept in his car parking somewhere in the vicinity of
his home or even far away on a parking place near a auto-
bahn. His reason for seeking help was the simple fact that
this way of living had become too exhausting for him in
his old age. Obviously it is not enough to know about this
deepest indefinability of oneself to prevent delusional
convictions.
On the other hand existence affords a rational attitude
([22], p. 48). "Existence is in need of reason. It becomes
unsettled and aware of transcendence's claim in the light
of reason, gets into its true movement via the prick of rea-
soning. Without reason existence is idle, sleeping, as if it
isn't there." ([22], p. 49, translation mine) Yet a rational
attitude is not enough in order to become an existence in
Jaspers' sense. Jaspers points out that an "existenceless rea-
son" dissolves into an "anything goes"-attitude because
then the person has the illusion that one needs not com-
mit oneself to life ([22], p. 50). The rational attitude is
therefore a necessary but not sufficient condition for exist-
ing. Existence is no grand intellectual event but rather
depends on nature and one's own being and can best be
understood as the relying of existence and reason upon
each other, illuminated in Jaspers' sentence: "Our essence
is Being-on-the-way." ([25], p. 109, translation mine) For
Jaspers existence produces beyond the simple reality of
being another, "higher" reality, which can give the beingPhilosophy, Ethics, and Humanities in Medicine 2009, 4:14 http://www.peh-med.com/content/4/1/14
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distinction and limits, but cannot generate it and remains
dependent and is well aware of this relying on each other
([22], p. 56).
If existence in the Jasperian sense relies on existential con-
victions as personal experiences, they are fundamentally
not knowledge, but related to a preobjectifying experi-
ence, an experience of suspendend subject-object-split-
ting. Are not deluded convictions the extreme opposite of
these existential convictions? What then about deluded
persons, what about Robert and Lydia and their possibil-
ity of reaching the level of existence in the Jasperian sense?
Jaspers answered, to my knowledge, only indirectly: "He
who gives himself up submitting to apotheosised objec-
tivities, loses himself as possible existence and therefore
the probability of a primary and evident recognition of his
transcendence. He only gains secure footholds, structure
of being and the edifying natures of illusionary transcend-
ence." ([21], II p. 145, translation mine) This theme can
be found in a great variety in Jaspers works as already
showed above (see also [26], p. 460 and p. 682 and p.
726). A person with dogmatic convictions sets the content
of his convictions as absolute and they gain the status of
knowledge. As a consequence this person "stands under
dominating conceptions and thoughts, lives in a more or
less conscious dogma and in corresponding preconcep-
tions." ([26], p. 726, translation mine) Though Jaspers
does not mention the comparableness of delusional con-
victions and dogmatic convictions, and there can be
doubts whether this is really a meaningful comparison
due to the intersubjective characteristic normally given in
dogmatic convictions and only seldom present in delu-
sional convictions (with the exception of a "folie a deux"),
it is obvious that for Jaspers a deluded person is not exist-
ing in his sense. The deluded person would need to
acknowledge that his delusional convictions are at least
partially his own product and that he co-created them.
With psychiatric knowledge and Jasperian criteria for
delusions in the background we must confess that exactly
this is not possible for the deluded person. In one word:
this impossibility is exactly his problem.
Still Jaspers' concept of existence resists all intentions to
break it down into special psychic functions, even though
existence in the Jasperian sense relies on psychic func-
tions. The deluded person, for example, has impaired
mental functions and can therefore not criticize his delu-
sional convictions. Yet this impairment is a very special
one. The deluded person is not completely unable to crit-
icize things rationally, but the critic is in service of the
delusional convictions. The impairment means exactly
this impossibility to criticize one's own delusional convic-
tions and it is this impossibility that qualifies them as
delusional convictions leading possibly to a paranoid
atmosphere. It is not the delusional convictions that are
the main problem for the deluded person, but the 'polar-
ization' and the paranoid atmosphere. Robert could never
comprehend that his loneliness was an important factor
for maintaining his ongoing experiences of persecution,
even though the persecution was less intense from that
time on when he had weekly contacts with a cognitive
training group and me as his psychiatrist, in which we
took a short stroll together through a park talking. In that
time he could normally sleep at home again, the paranoid
atmosphere was limited to bearable dimensions. He still
continued 'his way of living' - namely sleeping in the car -
from time to time, though he never said he did this of his
own volition. Yet personally I suspected that he did it
sometimes also because he liked it. Robert as a deluded
person with delusions in 'juxtaposition' can well be con-
sidered an existence in the Jasperian sense. His way of liv-
ing became difficult due to the decline of his vitality in old
age and the delusional convictions started to dominate his
day-to-day life more and more. Obviously it is the 'polar-
ization' of the "whole world", the subsumption of the
whole lived experience and all that is given under the
delusional conviction and the creation of an encompass-
ing paranoid atmosphere, that hinders the adoption of
one's own "wailing wall of existence" in a different way
than defined by the delusions. It is an escalated paranoid
atmosphere that prevents existence. The central question
for a deluded person is therefore, if the 'polarization' can
be stopped and if the paranoid atmosphere can be
reduced.
Conclusion
Paranoid atmospheres are of fundamental importance for
psychiatry. A paranoid atmosphere is not only important
with regard to deluded persons, but also with respect to
the "psychiatric gaze" and the question whether a person
can be understood as an existence in the sense of Jaspers.
As could be shown a paranoid atmosphere is also hidden
in the structure of the "psychiatric gaze", since it is neces-
sary as a psychiatrist to look behind the report and narra-
tive of the patient at hand when trying to understand the
structure and etiology of his disease. This suspicion mir-
rors the changes of the "clinical gaze" around 1800 as well
as the ongoing enlightenment at that time, even though
this paranoid atmosphere basically founding the "psychi-
atric gaze" needs enlightment itself. Psychiatric knowl-
edge is method-dependent and therefore in the need of
self-criticism. It is important for psychiatrists to realize
that the patient in front of them is more than psychiatric
knowledge can describe. This insight implies to further
realize that a last indefinability of a person as a human
being will always remain. Though this last indefinability
cannot be formulated as knowledge and has a status of a
belief, it is this basis that allows the psychiatrist to
acknowledge the deluded person's interpretation of the
world as truly his interpretation. This is mirrored in psy-Philosophy, Ethics, and Humanities in Medicine 2009, 4:14 http://www.peh-med.com/content/4/1/14
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chiatric knowledge, that the structure of delusional con-
victions can best be described by the replacement of belief
with knowledge and that the suffering of the deluded per-
son and this loss of degrees of freedom is bound to the
escalation and self-dynamics of delusions best described
as a paranoid atmosphere.
I tried to show that a deluded person can be understood
as an existence in the sense of Jaspers if the delusional
convictions don't create a paranoid atmosphere. For exist-
ing in the sense of Jaspers it is necessary to preserve exis-
tential beliefs, whereas delusions offer 'safety' when a
person cannot believe on an existential level anymore. In
delusions, indefinability, transcendence and encompass-
ment are driven into a subject-object split, fixed as knowl-
edge and appear therefore "displaced". Yet they are in a
deeper sense only "displaced", when such displacement
hinders existing in the sense of Jaspers. This occurs when
delusional convictions polarize the "whole world", since,
consequent to the creation of a profoundly paranoid
atmosphere, the person no longer acknowledges that the
question of truth cannot be answered exhaustively. Deep
scepticism regarding psychiatric knowledge shows that
the real problem is not the delusional convictions in
themselves but rather the escalation of the influence of
delusional convictions. With regard to this insight it can
be said that therapy is successful when the paranoid
atmosphere of the delusions can be diminished, and the
delusional conviction is brought in 'juxtaposition' or has
become a simple private delusional conviction again. It is
the acknowledgement that the suffering or enjoyment of a
person, the contentment with one's way of living, and the
question of whether a person is in charge of one's life are
necessarily answered personally, in spite of all possible
third-person answers, that opens these central aims of life
to alternative explanations. Consequently, such questions
can never be answered in absolute terms - and they are not
necessarily already answered with the delusional convic-
tions. Openness enables the psychiatrist to have an
empathic and respectful relationship with his deluded
patient, thereby mirroring the need for self-criticism of the
psychiatric discourse, and it enables the deluded person to
live a life as an existence - at least as long as his paranoid
atmosphere is not polarizing and encompassing the
"whole world". This can be supported through an
empathic and respectful relationship, in which one (the
psychiatrist) is mindful of the epistemological status of
knowledge and belief, so that one's own ability (the psy-
chiatrist's ability) for self-criticism prevents the creation of
a profound paranoid atmosphere in the patient's experi-
ence.
Competing interests
The authors declare that they have no competing interests.
Authors' informations
Jann E. Schlimme is a senior lecturer for psychiatry and
psychotherapy at Hannover Medical School (MHH, Ger-
many) and leads the section "Phenomenological Psychia-
try, Psychiatric Anthropology and History of Psychiatry"
integrated in the Department for Psychiatry, Socialpsychi-
atry and Psychotherapy (head: Stefan Bleich; former head:
Hinderk M. Emrich) at the Center for Mental Health of the
MHH. He was also a senior registrar in this Department
until 08-2009. From 09-2009 he is working as a senior
registrar at the Clinic for Psychiatry and Psychotherapy II
(head: Friedrich M. Wurst), University Clinic of the Para-
celsus Medical University Salzburg, Austria. Jann E
Schlimme holds an MD from Hannover Medical School
since 1998 and received his licence to lecture in 2007. He
also studied Sociology, Social Psychology and Philosophy
at Leibniz-University Hannover (Master of Arts, 2004)
and is actually working on his dissertation thesis in phi-
losophy regarding the impact of a phenomenological
enquiry of suicidality for mental health services.
Acknowledgements
I thank Michael A. Schwartz, Austin, Texas/USA, for editing and revising the 
pre-final draft of this paper and Alan Ralston, Alkmar, The Netherlands, for 
commenting an early draft of this paper.
The study and publication was supported by a grant of Hannover Medical 
School, Hanover, Germany in 2009.
References
1. Rinofner-Kreidl S: Anleitung zur Selbstsorge. Über den
ursprünglichen ethischen Charakter von Medizin und Philos-
ophie.  Psychol Medizin 2005, 16:17-24.
2. Kotowicz Z: Laing and the Paths of Anti - Psychiatry London:Taylor and
Francis; 1997. 
3. Parnas J, Sass LA: Self, solipsism, and schizophrenic delusions.
Philosophy, Psychiatry, Psychology 2001, 8:101-120.
4. Sass LA, Parnas J: Schizophrenia, consciousness, and the self.
Schizophr Bull 2003, 29:427-444.
5. Jaspers K: Allgemeine Psychopathologie Heidelberg: Springer; 1913. 
6. Musalek M: Meanings and Causes of Delusions.  In Nature and
Narrative. An introduction to the new philosophy of psychiatry Edited by:
Fulford KWM, Moris KJ, Sadler JZ, Stanghellini G. Oxford: Oxford
University Press; 2003:156-169. 
7. Tsouyopoulos N: German Philosophy and the Rise of Modern
Clinical Medicine.  Theoretical Medicine 1984, 5:345-357.
8. Foucault M: Die Geburt der Klinik. Eine Archäologie des ärztlichen Blicks.
Frankfurt/Main: Fischer; 1991. Translated by Seitter W. Original: Naissance
de la Clinique Paris: Presses Universitaires de France; 1963. 
9. Kraepelin E: Psychiatrie. Ein Lehrbuch. 2 Bände 6th edition. Leipzig:
Deuticke; 1899. 
10. Foucault M: Wahnsinn und Gesellschaft. Frankfut/Main: Suhrkamp; 1989.
Translated by Köppen U. Original: Histoire de la folie Paris: Librairie Plon;
1961. 
11. Kaufmann D: Aufklärung, bürgerliche Selbsterfahrung und die "Erfindung"
der Psychiatrie in Deutschland, 1770-1850 Göttingen: Vandenhoeck &
Ruprecht; 1995. 
12. Schlimme JE: Wahnsinnig psychiatrisch. Reflexionen über
Wahn und Wirklichkeit im, psychiatrischen Blick'.  In Wahn -
Wissen - Institution. Undisziplinierbare Näherungen Edited by: Pazzini K-
J, Schuller M, Wimmer M. Bielefeld: Transcript; 2005:259-292. 
13. Marneros A, Pillmann F: Das Wort Psychiatrie wurde in Halle geboren.
Von den Anfängen der deutschen Psychiatrie Stuttgart: Schattauer; 2006. 
14. Reil JC: Rhapsodieen über die Anwendung der psychischen Curmethode
auf Geisteszerrüttungen. Unaltered reprint Amsterdam: Bonset; 1803. Publish with BioMed Central    and   every 
scientist can read your work free of charge
"BioMed Central will be the most significant development for 
disseminating the results of biomedical research in our lifetime."
Sir Paul Nurse, Cancer Research UK
Your research papers will be:
available free of charge to the entire biomedical community
peer reviewed and published  immediately upon acceptance
cited in PubMed and archived on PubMed Central 
yours — you keep the copyright
Submit your manuscript here:
http://www.biomedcentral.com/info/publishing_adv.asp
BioMedcentral
Philosophy, Ethics, and Humanities in Medicine 2009, 4:14 http://www.peh-med.com/content/4/1/14
Page 12 of 12
(page number not for citation purposes)
15. Berner P: Paranoide Syndrome.  In K-P Kisker (Hg.), Psychiatrie der
Gegenwart. Klinische Psychiatrie I: Band II/1 2nd edition. Berlin Heidel-
berg: Springer; 1972:153-182. 
16. Scharfetter C: Wissen - Meinen - Irren - Wähnen. Das
Spektrum der Selbst- und Weltkonstrukte.  Fundamenta Psychi-
atrica 2003, 17:64-76.
17. Schinkel A, Schlimme JE: Aktives Vertrauen, aktives Misstrauen
und Paranoia. Thesen zu Personalität und Sozialität.  Hand-
lung Kultur Interpretation 2002, 11:134-153.
18. Rinofner-Kreidl S: Das Gehirn-Selbst.  Phänomenologische Forschun-
gen 2004:219-252.
19. Zahavi D: Subjectivity and Selfhood. Investigating the First-Person-Perspec-
tive Cambridge: MIT Press; 2003. 
20. Henry M: Inkarnation. Eine Phänomenologie des Fleisches. Freiburg/Breis-
gau: Alber; 2002. Translated by R. Kühn. Original: Incarnation. Une philos-
ophie de la chair Paris: Seuil; 2000. 
21. Jaspers K: Philosophie. 3 Bände München: Piper; 1932. 
22. Jaspers K: Vernunft und Existenz München & Zürich: Piper; 1960. 
23. Jaspers K: Der philosophische Glaube München: Piper; 1974. 
24. Rombach H: Strukturanthropologie. "Der menschliche Mensch" 2nd edi-
tion. Freiburg/Breisgau: Alber; 1993. 
25. Jaspers K: Grundfragen der Philosophie (12 Radiovorträge
von 1949).  In Was ist Philosophie? München: Deutscher Taschenbuch
Verlag; 1976. 
26. Jaspers K: Von der Wahrheit München: Piper; 1947. 